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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - REPRESENTATION BY
ATTORNEY DISQUALIFIED FOR
NON-PAYMENT OF BAR DUES
In a recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision the
Court put a new twist in the age-old constitutional right of the
accused in a criminal case to legal counsel, either by his own
selection or court appointment'.
In the lower court the appellant was convicted of murdering
a nine month old baby girl by crushing her skull with his
knee, and leaving her to die in the woods. He had confessed
to the killing and all the elements of the confession were cor-
roborated by the State's evidence. His sanity was placed in
issue by his counsel due to several commitments to mental
institutions since 1945. On conflicting expert testimony, the
jury found that he was of "dull normal" mentality but never-
theless sane since he could distinguish between right and wrong.
On appeal it was contended that the appellant had been
deprived of his right to effective legal counsel because his
court-appointed lawyer had not paid his bar dues since 1946
and had been removed from the practicing attorneys list. The
Appellate Court upheld this contention and reversed the con-
viction.
Under the Texas constitution, any person charged with a
capital offense must be represented by legal counsel unless
this right is expressly waived. Where the accused is indigent
and unable to retain counsel it is the duty of the court to ap-
point one2. The decision in the instant case turned upon the
court's interpretation of the phrase "legal counsel." Based
solely on the fact that the attorney had not paid his state bar
dues and therefore did not have his name on the list of practic-
ing attorneys, the majority of the court concluded that the
appellant had not received qualified counsel. No contention was
1 Eusebio Regalado Martinez v. State of Texas, 318 S.W.2d 66 (1958).
2 Vernon's Ann. Texas Const., Art. I, § 10.
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made that the attorney conducted an incompetent or faulty
defense.
No other case has been found which rests the decision on
such a technical ground. As a matter of substantive law it is
difficult to see where the accused was deprived of any privilege
to which he was entitled.
In a South Dakota case3 the counsel for the convicted de-
fendant had been disbarred several months prior to the trial.
On appeal the defendant pointed out that the disbarred attorney
had complete control of his case at the trial level, and attempted
to rely on this as grounds for reversal. In regard to this argu-
ment the court said:
While Mr. Sullivan (the attorney) may have
deceived the court and his client and thereby
subjected himself to the discipline of the court,
this fact alone would not entitled the defendant
to a new trial unless it appeared that his rights
have been prejudiced in some manner by the
deception of his counsel'.
In State v. Myers5 the court said that our most prized and
cherished right is that of a fair trial and the only way to main-
tain this right is to provide an accused with effective counsel,
which means:
... honest, learned, and able legal counsel
given a reasonable opportunity to perform the
task assigned to him by the court. Only when it
clearly appears in the record that this discretion
has been abused should we interfere6.
3 State v. Johnson, 64 S.D. 162, 265 N.W. 599 (1936).
4 The counsel was later tried and convicted of contempt of court and sen-
tenced to 30 days in jail. In Re Sullivan, 64 S.D. 165, 264 N.W. 601 (1936).
5 248 Iowa 44, 79 N.W.2d 382 (1956).
6287 U.S. 45 (1932). Also brought up on the same docket were the other
two accused in Patterson v. Alabama, and Weems v. Alabama.
Most courts have adopted this policy and placed the burden
on the accused to prove that he was not afforded a fair trial
based on the record.
The leading case on the right to counsel is Powell v. Ala-
bama7. Although the trial judge had appointed the entire
local bar to defend the accused, it was not until the day of the
trial that anyone communicated with him in regard to his
defense. Thus the Supreme Court held that as a matter of
substantive right the accused was not afforded a fair trial. No
lawyer could defend such a case effectively without investi-
gating his client's side of the case before the day of the trial.
The reported cases on this point have applied the test:
"Did the deficiency in counsel prejudice the rights of the ac-
cused?" They have affirmed convictions where the attorney was
young and inexperienced, the ink on his bar certificate being
"hardly dry"8, counsel failed to raise the defense of insanity',
counsel failed to refute the good character of the deceased who
the accused was charged with murdering", or where counsel
was "negligent or unskillful 1."
The rule of the instant case requires a trial free of technical
error regardless of the effect on the substantive rights of the
accused. At a time when our court calendars are filled years
in advance, the unfortunate result of the widespread adoption
of such a criteria is readily apparent. Had the court chosen
the approach of the dissent, supported by the long established
doctrine of jeofails, that: no error committed during the course
of the trial should vitiate the verdict unless the error was pre-
judicial to the rights of the accused, those rights would have
been protected and the cause of judicial efficiency advanced.
7 Iowa v. Dangelo, 182 Iowa 125, 166 N.W. 587 (1918); United States v.
Stoecker, 216 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1954); Williams v. United States,
218 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1954); Jones v. Texas, 159 Cr. 526, 265
S.W.2d 116 (1954).
8 People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459, 110 P.2d 408 (1941).
9 People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
10 Ex parte Lovelady, 152 Cr. 93, 207 S.W.2d 396 (1948).
"1 State v. Jukich, 49 Nev. 217, 242 P. 590 (1926); Diggs v. Welch, 148
F.2d 667 D.D.C. (1945).
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The utility of the instant holding is further jeopardized by
the fact that a convicted accused is not deterred by the possi-
bility of perjury and contempt proceedings from lying in order
to avail himself of a technical point based on his counseFs
conduct.
Under the Texas constitution, the State may not re-try an
accused where, as here, the conviction has been reversed on
appeal1". An acknowledged criminal is a free man due to tech-
nical error which had no effect on his substantive rights. Justice
is a two-edged sword; the people should not be denied the
enforcement of the law unfettered by frivolous rules which
are not required by the rights of the accused.
There have been no Virginia cases deciding the point at
issue in the instant case but reversals have only been granted
where some substantive right of the accused was violated. There
is no reason to allow a decision to be set aside solely because
of a defect in form. If an accused's substantive rights have not
been breached and, a lawyer, no matter how competent, would
have employed the same tactics and the jury would have reached
the same verdict, then it should not matter that the defending
lawyer had not paid his bar association dues. The burden of
proof should rest upon the accused to show where his rights
have been prejudiced.
L.P.R.
12 Texas Constitution, Art. 5, § 26, Art. 1, § 14. It is explicit in declaring
"the state shall have no right of appeal in criminal cases.
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